A labor supply model is used to examine the relationship between farm ownership and operators' participation in the off-farm labor market for the Northeast region. The results indicate that ownership significantly influences operators' off-farm employment participation. In particular, part-owners significantly allocate labor services to off-farm activities. The results also show that the participation rate among part-owner operators is high partly because the availability of other income sources accelerates the process of acquiring assets to become full-owner operators.
. agricultural production. Third, age and gender of The authors observe that during the process of operators significantly contribute to off-farm work urbanization, land tends to be idle in anticipation participation. In particular, female and elderly opof conversion, which creates pressures to increase erators are more likely to participate in off-farm income from off-farm employment. Finally, activities. Finally, both farming experience and the Gustafson and Bills (1984) , Lee (1982 Lee ( , 1983 , existence of supplementary income reduce off- Lewis (1978) , Wunderlich (1991 Wunderlich ( , 1993 , and farm work participation. Overall, the results with USDA (1994) argue that during the urbanization respect to the relationship between ownership and process farmland ownership patterns tend to off-farm employment suggest that part-owner opchange before conversion. Gustafson and Bills erators tend to work off the farm mainly because show that about one-third of the land with the po-off-farm employment is seen as a source of suppletential for conversion in the Northeast is located in mentary income required for the continuation of the most urbanized counties, which implies a pos-farming activities. sible change in farm ownership pattern. Overall, The paper is organized as follows. Following the urbanization changes farmland ownership pattern introduction, we discuss some of the relationships and directs farm operators toward off-farm work to among farm ownership, type of farming activities, enhance farm household income. Thus, it is impor-and off-farm work participation using a correlation tant to investigate ownership patterns and off-farm matrix. In the next section, we present a labor supwork tendencies of farm operators in urbanized ply model for farm operators who have the option areas.
of allocating labor to either farm or nonfarm acIt is clear from the above studies that research tivities. The following section describes the econhas ignored the influence of farm ownership on ometric estimation used in the analysis. We then off-farm work participation. Furthermore, to our discuss some features of the data and define the knowledge, the relationships among farm owner-variables used in the estimation. The next section ship, off-work participation, and urbanization, discusses the results of the empirical framework which are of particular importance to the North-developed above. Finally, we summarize the major east, have not been examined in the literature. As a conclusions and discuss their implications. result of these omissions, research has failed to inform the public debate on off-farm work participation and land-use issues and thus has provided Background little guidance to policymakers examining land-use policy. We hypothesize that the increasing non-The correlation matrix provides some insights with farm-use value of farmland due to high urbaniza-respect to the relationship between off-farm emtion (measured by population density in persons ployment and farm ownership. These relationships per square mile) and the land ownership structure are discussed in detail below. in the Northeast are likely (1) to cause inefficient
The correlation of -0.91 between urbanization input decisions due to distorted farm input prices, and the acres of land held by a full-owner operator (2) to create an unwillingness to invest in farming, indicates that such operators are less likely to have and (3) to lead to the conversion of farmland into farmland in highly urbanized areas. This result nonfarm use. During this process of conversion, may be due to the high opportunity cost of farming farm organizations with shorter planning horizons in urbanized areas, where the estimated market tend to own a greater proportion of farmland for value of land is significant. Essentially, the same speculative purposes (speculation is measured by relationship (-0.74) holds for part-owners as well. the ratio of the value of per acre land in the North-These findings suggest that full-owner and parteast to the value of per acre land in the United owner operators tend to hold small parcels of land States) and to rely on off-farm employment activi-in areas where the land value is high. ties to supplement their incomes (Spitze and Ma-
The findings also lead to the following observahoney 1991; Saupe and Gould 1991; Gebremedhin tions. First, full/part-owner operators tend not to 1991; Gladwin 1991).
hold land with immediate potential for conversion. Some of the results obtained from the estimation This observation is consistent with the convenof the off-farm work participation model are as tional wisdom that suggests that the size of farmfollows. First, declining farm output encourages land (measured by the acres of land per farm) is farm operators to seek employment opportunities negatively correlated with urbanization and market in the off-farm labor market. Second, participation value of land. The correlations for size and urbanin the off-farm labor market is high among part-ization and for size and market value are -0.86 and owner operators because they engage in seasonal -0.80, respectively. It is also important to observe that the correlation of -0.45 between age of an in farm production decisions. The analysis indioperator and acres of land held by a part-owner rectly suggests that full-owners, part-owners, and operator implies that in states where part-owner tenants differ in their output and input decisions. operators are in the majority, the average age is The ultimate question addressed by this study is low or to some degree the average age of part-the extent to which these differences and farmers' owner operators is low. In this respect, part-owners characteristics account for the variation in off-farm are expected to be more likely to expand their pro-work participation. To address this question, we duction base than are other agents.
examine the relationships among the structure of A careful examination of the correlation be-farm ownership, farm output, and the propensity to tween the type of land an operator owns and farm participate in off-farm work for the Northeast reownership provides a framework for understanding gion. The initial evidence indicates that participathe relationship between ownership and farming tion is high in states where the average age of an activities. First, part-owner operators are more operator and the number of female operators (relalikely to hold cropland than are full-owner opera-tive to male) are high, and participation is low in tors. This observation is supported by the correla-states where per farm total sales, per farm livetion of acres of cropland per farm with acres of stock/poultry sales, the number of farm enterprises land per part-owner and full-owner operator (the organized as partnerships, and per farm cropland correlations are 0.89 and 0.72, respectively). Sec-are high (see table 1) . ond, compared with part-owner operators, fullWhile the above observations strongly indicate owner operators engage in labor-intensive live-that the characteristics of farming and farm operastock and poultry farming. This conclusion is also tors are important factors that help explain the mosupported by the correlation of acres of land per tivation for participating in off-farm work, what is full-owner (0.68) and part-owner operator (0.62) less clear, and to our knowledge has not been adwith per farm livestock and poultry sales. To this dressed in the literature, is the role of farm ownend, full-owners tend to hold land for livestock and ership in the off-farm work participation. poultry farming, which reduces the chances for participating in off-farm work, while part-owners are involved mostly in seasonal crop farming, The Model which allows them to look for job opportunities off the farm.
The labor supply model, developed by Huffman The comparison of the two different farming ac- (1980) , is treated as a set of joint decisions for tivities with respect to off-farm employment sug-leisure and market goods. The model assumes that gests that farm operators in states where crop farm-utility is derived from farm production that is subing dominates are more likely to work off the farm. ject to the constraints of time, farm production, and This observation is supported by the correlations income. This model describes a commercial farm between off-farm work participation and per farm that employs both hired and family labor and that cropland, -0.59, and per farm livestock sales, markets all its output and operates in a competitive -0.61. The inference that both livestock/poultry labor market (Barnum and Squire 1979; Huffman and nursery/greenhouse are more labor intensive 1980). than crop farming is also supported by the positive Operators' off-farm work participation is formucorrelation of per farm livestock/poultry sales and lated in such a way that each operator maximizes of per farm nursery/greenhouse sales with the his/her utility, U(C,TL;V1). The function U(.) is number of years an operator spends on the present assumed to be strictly concave and satisfy U cfarm (0.58 and 0.63; see table 1). The above observations summarize the impor-aU (.) /aTL > 0. The total amount of goods purtance of farm ownership structure on land conver-chased by an operator is denoted by C and the total sion and suggest implications for off-farm work leisure time of the operator by TL. The vector, V 1 participation. Farm ownership may also impact -(V,. . ., V"), includes factors exogenous to opfarm productivity. This hypothesis is tested empiri-erators' consumption and leisure decisions. cally by estimating a Cobb-Douglas production An operator faces the time constraint, function that includes ownership categories. In par-T ticular, full ownership influences farm output () F OF + L negatively, while a positive relationship exists be-where his/her total time endowment is denoted by tween tenancy and farm output (table 2). The re-T; T F and TOF denote the time allocated for farm suits of the estimation of the production function and off-farm activities, respectively. The farm propresent evidence that farm ownership is important duction function, X(1) = Per farm crop sales (including nursery, $1,000) X(2) = Per full-owner operator's land (acres) X(3) = Per part-owner operator's land (acres) X(4) = Average age of an operator X(5) = Per farm harvested cropland (acres) X(6) = Per farm total sales ($1,000) X(7) = Per farm total land (acres) X(8) = Per farm land value ($1,000) X(9) = Number of off-farm operators (any/none) X(10) = Per farm livestock/poultry sales ($1,000) X(11) = Per farm dairy sales ($1,000) X(12) = Per farm nursery/greenhouse sales ($1,000) X(13) = Per farm grain sales ($1,000) X(14) = Per farm cropland (acres) X(15) = Average number of years spent on present farm X(16) = Number of operators (female/male) X(17) = Number of farms (partnership/family) X(18) = Estimated market value of land ($1,000) (SPECU) X(19) = 1990 population per square mile (URBAN)
(2) Q = F(Tr,fl;V 2 , A), tics that are taken as given by the operator at the is assumed to be strictly concave and to exhibit time he/she makes production and input-use deciconstant returns to scale. Let Q and A denote the sions. These characteristics include tenure of orgafarm output and the amount of land used in farm nizaton (full-owner or part-owner operators and production, respectively. The vector, f (f tenants) and type of organization (i.e., individual/ family, partnership, and corporation). 1s), denotes other variable inputs with the associ-family, partnership, and corporation).
,ated input price vector i n o,,..., o). These .
We assume that farm operators face the followated input price vector wo =_ ((ol,. . w(os). These ing budget constraint: inputs include hired farm labor, capital, and enconstraint ergy. The vector, V 2 , represents farm characteris- (3) PcC + O.f = PQQ + wTOF + R * and **, respectively, indicate 0.1 and 0.05 significance levels. The ownership variables, F-OWN, P-OWN, and TENANT, are defined as the proportion of full-owner, part-owner, and tenant operators, respectively (F-OWN + P-OWN + TENANT = 1).
where PQ and Pc denote for the price of farm (9) Q = Q(TF,l), "production function" output and the price vector of purchased goods, respectively. The variable R is the operator's non-(10) C = C(Q,f,ToF), "budget constraint" wage income and is considered exogenous to his/ where denotes the vector of inputs excluding her consumption and leisure decisions.
A her consumption and leisure decisions. aj. Equations (5)- (10) show that an operator's deGiven (co, w, PQ, Pc, T, A, RV 5 ,V 2 ), a farm opera-cision to participate in off-farm work, TO, is made tor maximizes his/her utility subject to the con-simultaneously with decisions regarding the use of straints (1), (2), (3), and nonnegativity conditions farm iputs, ncluding operator's on-farm work, 
(4) U(.) + I [T -TF -TOF -TLJ
Strict concavity of farm production and operators' + p. 2 [P Q + wTOF utility functions together with the linear constraints + R -PcC - (.}] guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the so-
lution. 3 The solution of the system (5)- (10) 
UC(C,TL; V)
In the ideal situation, data on time allocated to off-farm activities should be used to estimate equa-
aF(TF,f;V 2
,A) tion (11). Because such data are not available in the (7) PQ j.
(j => j-= lj ( Q ,-lj) Census of Agriculture data set used in this study, for V•/_ the number of farm operators reporting at least four hours a day of off-farm work is used as a proxy for (8 Table 3 defines the where Nj and N f denote the number of farm op-variables, which are expressed as per farm figures. erators reporting any off-farm work days and op-For example, per farm output in county j, Q, is the erators reporting no off-farm work days in county ratio of total farm output to the number of farms in j, respectively; Nj is the total number of operators county j. in county j. The relationship between county j's
The data contain county-based information on participation rate, Rj, and explanatory variables, Xj, (1) personal characteristics, such as average age of is stated as, an operator, number of male and female operators, number of black operators, and number of years an 1 operator has spent on the present farm; (2) tenure (12) [
of organization, such as number of operators who fully or partly own farms, and number who are where Ej is the vector of random disturbances. tenants; (3) type of organization, such as number of Equation (12) is transformed into the logit func-farms operated by individuals/families, partners, tion, and corporations; (4) residence of operators, such as number of operators who live on farm; and (5) /'( . -R j \off-farm employment information, such as number (13) ln 1 R.
of operators working off-farm between 0 and 49
days a year, between 50 and 99 days a year, and so on. which provided the best goodness of fit and tData used in estimating the production function ratios. 4 The transformed dependent variable now are expressed in real terms. The real values for the becomes the difference between the natural loga-output and input variables are obtained by dividing rithm of off-farm work participation and the natu-monetary variables by their respective price indiral logarithm of on-farm work participation rates; ces (with 1990-92 = 100).5 The price indices inthat is, ln(Nl/Nf). This difference reflects the clude production, feed, livestock and poultry, seed, amount by which operators' off-farm labor supply fertilizer, fuels, supplies and repairs, autos and is favored. Thus equation (13) is estimated to ap-trucks, farm machinery, and building materials. proximate the relationship obtained in equation (11).
Descriptive Statistics The coefficient 3 1 = aln(Rj/(l -Rj))/alnXj is the percentage change in ln(Nj/Nf) corresponding In this section we briefly discuss some of the imto one percentage change in Xj. Disturbances in portant features of the variables used and provide equation (13) are assumed to follow an indepen-an overall picture of the data set using the means, dent normal distribution with zero mean and vacorrelation coi-ef the standard deviations, and the correlation coeffiance, l/mRj(l1 -Rj), where m j is the number of cients farms in countyj. The variance is a consequence of
The participation rates in off-farm work for the a binomial distribution underlying R6 (Zellner and Northeast states are as follows: Connecticut, 0.55; Lee 1965). Maine, 0.58; New Hampshire, 0.59; New Jersey, 0.59; New York, 0.48; Massachusetts, 0.54; Rhode Island, 0.50; Vermont, 0.49; and Pennsylvania, 4 Alternatives include semi-log specification, In(Nj°/A) = 3 o + PX j + Ej . NJf and Nf respectively denote the number of operators reporting any off-farm work days and the number of operators reporting no off-farm
The base year, (1990-92) = 100, means that the average of an index work days in county j.
over the time period 1990-92 is equal to 100. The average percentage of family/individual farms in the Northeast is approximately 0.84, which implies that most full-owner and part-owner opera- which is consistent with expectations that the increasing value of land in the Northeast directed farmers to high-return agricultural products such as nursery/greenhouse crops and away from grain. Thus, the number of farmers producing high-return 25 products increased in the region (Figures 3a, 3b , and 3c). Overall, both the shrinking in the laborintensive dairy sector and the moderate growth in 
(FAMILY) or by a partnership (PARTNER

Estimation Results
The system of equations (5)- (10) is solved simul-
taneously for the endogenous variables including
Ig {lfarm output, consumption, production inputs, and . ..-20- I' II off-farm labor supply. However, simultaneity bias 0S r"«'5 " a presents a problem in estimating equation (13) (6), Q in equation (9), and TOF in equaGrain Sales. c. Number of Farms.
tion (8). To address this problem, farm output from the estimated production function is assumed to be are tenants (sum to one). New Jersey has the high-the expected profit maximizing output and is used est percentage of full-owner operators (74%), Ver-as an instrumental variable in the estimation of the mont has the highest percentage of part-owner operators (38%), and Rhode Island has the highest percentage of tenants (12%). 6 The variable SPECU does not exactly reflect the estimated farm-use A similar classification involves the variables value of land, since in its calculation the general price levels, rather than related to the type of organiza , sh as e agricultural input-output prices. are used. Net cash rent, defined as cash related to the type of organization, such as the rent minus property tax, is one of the proxies for the farm-use value of number of farms operated by a family/individual land. This measure was suggested in a conversation with G. Wunderlich. participation model. 7 This approach also allows us to capture the effect of inefficient input-output de-Q = + Q= AIX ''P . cisions on off-farm work participation. A statistii=1 cally significant and negative coefficient of the variable lfiQ in the participation model would im-Ql and Qc are respectively the values of final liveply that inefficiency in the input-output choices stock output and final crop output. p is the share of partly directs operators toward off-farm employ-final livestock products in total final output. A, ct i , ment.
and Pi are unknown parameters. Separate production functions for the two final products are not Production Function implied and production is joint. Furthermore, it is a useful simplifying assumption that the true coeffiMost firms in agriculture are multiproduct firms cients in the production function depend on the that produce at least two broad classes of final share of livestock products in the total output, p. products-crop products and livestock products. The production function estimated is then speciThe production of these final products requires fied as many of the same inputs, but the technical relationship between inputs and outputs seems likely to differ. For example, when livestock products (14) lnQ = ln(A)+ (ot i + pi)lnX i + . dominate output, the livestock input-to-output ratio i is likely to be higher than that when crop products The dependent variable for the production function dominate output. In order to capture differences of in put parameters due to product mix differences is county 's real farm output, Qj defined as the input parameters due to product mix differences, ratio of the total sales deflated by the price index of we formulate agriculture as a multiproduct indus-all farm products. To permit the input-output relatry (Huffman 1976) and specify the technical relafarm product mix a thereby tionship to vary by farm product mix and thereby tionship between outputs and inputs as g y in mix of to better fit observations differing widely in mix of crop and livestock output, the measure for the mix 7 Huffman (1980) adopts the same approach to avoid the simultaneous of output (the livestock output share of total farm equation bias.
output, p) is included as a separate input into the production function. The coefficients of the esti-comes scarcer and values increase, operators mated production function, switch from land-intensive farming to highervalued dairy, nursery, and greenhouse enterprises. ln (a + pA3) This result is in fact supported by the correlation alnXi coefficients between per farm land value and per farm dairy sales (0.48) and per farm nursery and are the elasticity of the independent variable X farm dairy sales (0.48) and per farm nursery and greenhouse sales (0.39). Another explanation for with respect to farm output Q. Notice that the pa-greenhouse sales (0.39). Another explanation for rameter p is also another variable. The coefficient this negative relationship between LAND and farm Pi measures the influence of p on output is that the increasing value of land due to urbanization leads to land speculation, which re-/ alnQ suits in decreasing investment in maintaining the alnQ \a(lnaX,) quality of farmland. To this end, we observe that n that is -= ,.
holding land for speculative purposes reduces per alnXi, ap acre farm output. One of the implications of the A positive 3Pi represents an increase in the output negative relation of land with agricultural producelasticity due to marginal increase in the output tion is that farmland preservation policies in effect share of, for example, livestock products.
have a limited capacity to offset the conversion of The farm production function (equation [14] ) is land to nonfarm uses, a finding supported by Loestimated by ordinary least squares technique. The pez, Adelaja, and Andrews (1988). estimation of log-log production function shows that 72% of the variation in farm output is ex-Off-Farm Work Participation Model plained by the conventional input variables (table 6). All of the inputs (except LAND) are statisti-The dependent variable for the participation model cally significant at the 0.05 level or better. Not is the natural logarithm of the odds of participating surprisingly, the estimated coefficient of LAND is in the off-farm labor market, ln(Rj/(l -Ri)) or negative, implying that farm output is low in coun-ln(NjA/Nl). The independent variables related to ties where farm land is abundant. This finding vali-farm ownership categories include full-owner opdates the argument that as land for agriculture be-erators (F-OWN), part-owner operators (P-OWN), 
policies that increase farm income decrease the *-ie 1o~. IIgl : '' 5likelihood that farm operators will participate in Is.< < s e e~ ~ the off-farm labor market. The negative coefficient .-. I5 of wages for hired labor suggests that participation is low in counties where wages are high . However, this relationship is not statistically significant.
60
The ownership participation elasticities indicate that farm ownership affects the decision to partici- ants lowers the participation by 0.1%. This and surprisingly participate in off-farm work as negative relationship is also supported by the esti-well (correlation 0.59). This finding is surprising mation result in table 2, which suggests that tenants because, although dairy farming is highly labor positively contribute to farm output and hence tend intensive, female operators are able to invest time to concentrate on farm activities. in off-farm activities. It bears noting that the type of farm organization Farming experience is proxied by the variable is also significant in explaining the variation in YEARS, defined as the average number of years off-farm work participation. In particular, the sign that an operator has been operating the present of the partnership variable, PARTNER, is nega-farm. The coefficient of YEARS, -1.11, implies tive, which indicates that farm operators of farm that a 10% increase in the number of years of onenterprises organized as partnerships are less likely farm experience reduces the likelihood of off-farm to participate in the off-farm labor market. This participation by 11.1%. Thus, as farming experifinding may be due in part to the large capital and ence increases, the likelihood that a farm operator human resource investments necessary to operate will participate in off-farm work decreases. Howcommercial farm businesses. The results thus sug-ever, the estimated coefficient of AGE of an opgest that the commercialization of agriculture de-erator suggests the opposite effect. This result is creases competition between farm and nonfarm la-puzzling and perhaps suggests that farm operators bor.
are entering farming at older ages. This assumption The personal characteristics of farm operators, is supported to some extent by the lack of signifisuch as age and gender, significantly contribute to cance between AGE and YEARS. off-farm employment. The results show that farm
The estimated coefficient for other income, OI operators increasingly allocate labor to off-farm (payments received for participation in federal work as they grow older. This result is also sup-farm programs denoted by GOV and income from ported by the correlation coefficient of 0.59 be-other farm activities denoted by OFI), is significant tween age and off-farm participation. The finding and positive. The results indicate that a 10% inseems to contradict the life-cycle hypothesis, crease in supplementary income reduces off-farm which suggests that elderly operators tend to con-work participation by approximately 2%. This sume what they earned when young. The hypoth-finding suggests, in part, that government farmesis projects a low off-farm participation at later income policy subsidizes off-farm work. stages in life. 9 A possible reason for this finding is The effects of other income on participation can that older farm operators may have shorter plan-be further evaluated with reference to the estimated ning horizons and are thus reluctant to make sub-coefficient for the interaction (OI*P-OWN) term. stantial investments in new technology. The posi-This coefficient is significant and positive. Thus, tive correlation coefficient of 0.42 between AGE as the supplementary income of part-owner operaand per farm grain sales suggests that older farm tors increases, so does the tendency to participate operators may switch from the more labor inten-in off-farm activities.°In other words, partsive enterprises such as dairy and vegetables to operators are more responsive to off-farm work grain production.
opportunities as their supplementary income inThe results also suggest that gender plays an creases. important role in off-farm participation. The analysis shows that the coefficient of the variable FE-MALE/MALE is positive and significant and indi-Conclusion cates female operators are more likely to participate in off-farm activities than are male operators. n ff-f ii f~. . ,~.
*c .
T^ATT-;An off-farm work participation model for the A positive correlation of 0.49 between FEMALE/ A positive correlation of 0.49 between FEMALE/ Northeast region is estimated to capture the rela-MALE and per farm dairy sales illustrates that fe-tionship between farm ownership and operators' male operators engage in labor-intensive farming off-farm work decisions. A novel feature of this study is the conceptualization of the importance of farm ownership in off-farm employment decisions.
9 When the variables AGE and (AGE) 2 are simultaneously included in Th empirical framework involves the estimation the participation model, it is found that AGE is convex with respect to ln(Nj°Al). In particular, we find aln(Nj/Nj)/aln(AGE) < 0 and a 2 in(Nj/ of a farm production function and a participation NJ)/1ln(AGE) 2 > 0, which imply that up to a certain age, off-farm work is not desirable, but after the critical age, off-farm work participation gains momentum. Among the factors behind this convex labor supply decision are farmers' risk-averse attitudes toward likely health problems ' The interactions between the payments and full-owners and beat later ages. (These estimation results can be obtained from the authors tween the payments and tenants are also estimated but are found to be upon request. 
